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Is there a conspiracy by certain philosophers to turn the Social Epistemology Review & Reply 
Collective into a clearing house for articles on conspiracy theories and conspiracy theory 
theories? That I cannot answer (for a variety of reasons), but what I can say is that a recent 
reply piece by Patrick Stokes, ‘Reluctance and Suspicion: Reply to Basham and Dentith’2 has 
induced me to put pen to paper once again. 
 
Stokes’ piece is a reply to two earlier pieces, one by myself, and another by fellow 
philosopher of conspiracy theories, Lee Basham.3 Stokes’ commentary on Basham’s piece 
will not concern me here (I suspect the agents working for the aforementioned putative 
conspiracy about this journal will do that job for me). Rather, I want to focus on what I 
think Stokes gets right about his reply to me (the worry about how we deal with conspiracy 
theories in public discourse), and what I think he gets wrong (how I think an investigation 
into conspiracy theories would work). I do not think Stokes gets my view wrong through any 
mistake on his part. Rather, due to a poor choice of words on my part, I failed to adequately 
describe my view, and this naturally lead Stokes to assume I imagined a more individualistic, 
less socially epistemic investigator (or set of investigators) into these things we call 
‘conspiracy theories.’ 
 
The Investigator(s) 
 
In ‘Reluctance and Suspicion,’ Stokes takes me to task for speciating out what I label as 
‘conspiracy narratives’—arational, rhetorical bad habits associated with particular 
conspiratorial tropes—from conspiracy theorising generally. He points out that these 
conspiracy narratives seem awfully hard to distinguish from actual cases of conspiracy 
theorising. Stokes is too polite to claim I am engaging in the No True Scotsman Fallacy4. He 
saves his criticism for the crux of my reply5 to his first reply6 (we are hurtling towards a 
conspiracy theory theory inception), where I argue we can hand wave the problem away by 
appealing to an investigator locked up in a room, ‘dispassionately coming up with conspiracy 
theories, and then getting her lackeys to see if they have any merit’ (my words, not his).7 
Stokes characterises my putative investigator as someone: 
 
[S]omehow oblivious to conspiracy theorizing as a social practice—perhaps 
she, in a nod to Frank Jackson’s “Mary,” has been raised in an environment 
where she has never been exposed to any existing conspiracy theories or 
conspiracy tropes. Her conspiracy theories are, let’s stipulate, self-standing 
and sui generis alternatives to “official” explanations of given events.8 
                                                
2 Stokes 2017. 
3 Basham 2016. 
4 Or, like me, he’s not sure what to call it now, given that the label seems rather racist. 
5 Dentith 2016. 
6 Stokes 2016. 
7 Dentith 2016, 28. 
8 Stokes 2017, 49. 
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Now, as I noted in the piece Stokes is replying to, knowing about these narratives/social 
practices is part-and-parcel of being an investigator with regard to conspiracy theories. I 
admit that this is not immediately obvious, but when I wrote about: 
 
[S]peciating out talk of conspiracy theories with respect to conspiracy 
theorising and the invocation of conspiracy narratives is principled case of 
the particularist insisting that we need to work with the evidence (Dentith 
2016, 31). 
 
I was talking about how particularists-qua-investigators should go about their investigative 
work. That is to say, like the detective investigating the murder of a spouse, there is certain 
background information we expect the detective to be aware of, such as the likelihood of the 
surviving partner being the most plausible perpetrator, etc. But my point could have been 
clearer, and for that I apologise. 
However, my chief mistake was to talk about an investigator, and her lackeys. That is to say, 
I posited a quite individualistic notion of the investigator when the model I am proposing 
for the investigation of these things called ‘conspiracy theories’ is more akin to a community 
of inquiry. 
 
Communities of Inquiry 
 
A community of inquiry (a term I take from the works of John Dewey9 and C. S. Pierce10) is 
a community-led inquiry into problematic situations, where members of said community co-
operate in a democratic and participatory fashion. It is a way of talking how best to distribute 
the epistemic burden when it comes to the discussion and analysis of complex claims (and 
thus, by extension, these things called ‘conspiracy theories’). Such a community operates on 
the assumption that while there may be no one expert (or set of experts) with respect to the 
complex claims contained in many conspiracy theories, we can compensate for the lack of 
conspiracy theory expertise by sharing the epistemic burden across a suitably constituted 
community.11 Potential members of a community of inquiry will include interested members 
of the public, journalists (both professional and citizen), the police, the judiciary, politicians, 
and the like. 
 
Describing my putative investigators in the singular ‘she’ was a mistake born out of not quite 
having nailed down aspects of the terminology of my current research project, ‘Investigating 
conspiracy theories.’ A social epistemologist at heart, I have always thought that how we 
analyse any complex claim is a community affair, one of sorting out who shoulders the 
epistemic burdens, and who gets to be a ‘free rider,’ appealing to the views of others. So, 
Stokes was mislead only because of my poor choice of words. 
                                                
9 Dewey 1938. 
10 Pierce 1958. 
11  I have a (hopefully) forthcoming paper on this issue, but—in short—I take it while there are no 
institutionally-accredited experts in conspiracy theories (unlike, say, in the sciences), and that any conspiracy 
theorist worth their salt will find issue with appeals to expertise or authority when it comes to dismissing some 
conspiracy theory (because of the worry the institutions which accredit expertise or authority might be 
conspired) we can partially solve both of these problems by properly allocating the epistemic burden across 
members in our societies. 
 
 
 
 
 6 
Vol. 6, no. 4 (2017): 4-11  
http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3xS 
Stokes asks what would motivate these investigators, given they are supposedly isolated from 
conspiracy theorising as a social practice? I think they would—in an ideal setting—be 
spurred by the idea that if a conspiracy theory turned out to be warranted, then surely we 
would be obliged to do something about it? Obviously that sense of obligation is linked 
somehow to scale and/or purpose; a conspiracy to organise a surprise party is something 
you might well encourage, rather than work against (unless you hate surprise parties). A 
political conspiracy to rort an election, however, is something most of us think we ought to 
work against.12 
 
Dispassionate Investigations 
 
Now, Stokes might find issue with this fuller picture of a community-led investigation in 
conspiracy theories because of my stipulation about the investigator(s) ‘dispassionate’ nature. 
He notes that: 
 
[W]e do not apply our evidential reasoning in a vacuum, but do so from 
within historically conditioned and epistemically finite situations, in a world 
already freighted with moral and political meanings.13 
 
I admit, talking about the ‘dispassionate’ nature of the investigator(s) was another poor 
choice of words on my part.14 What I was trying to get across with the label ‘dispassionate’ is 
that an investigator can be informed by cultural mores, etc., but that does not mean that she is 
immediately or necessarily subject to them. Which is to say that members of the community 
of inquiry will surely know about certain conspiracy narratives (or the social practices 
associated with some cases of conspiracy theorising) without necessarily having to in any way 
endorse or engage with them. 
 
Indeed, the diversity of members within a community of inquiry should help with this, in 
that even if some members embrace the trope, others in the community will question it. Said 
communities may also end up being international or globalist in constitution, so views which 
might not be socially or politically unacceptable in one context might be allowed to be 
expressed in some other. Finally, the diversity of the community (properly—there’s that 
word again—constituted) should mean even if some members act insincerely, that insincerity 
                                                
12 Some people might disagree, if they think the party favoured by the conspiracy ought to be in control; a 
diverse community of inquirers should be able to counteract the pro this-conspiracy aspect of some of its 
members. 
13 Stokes 2017, 50. 
14 One reason to think ‘dispassionate’ is a poor choice of word here is a curious but troubling aspect of 
contemporary debate, which is that passion (whether anger, joy, or sadness) is taken to be a mark against 
someone’s argument in much public discourse. The marginalised person of colour, or the trans person, say, 
who gets angry about some policy debate, or discussion of institutional prejudice, is taken to not be arguing 
properly. Instead, they are asked to be dispassionate about the details of a debate which affects them 
personally, as if separating their lived experience from their discourse is somehow a good thing. It is easy to be 
dispassionate about events which do not directly effect you, but it is very cruel indeed to ask those who are 
directed effected to be dispassionate by those very same events. 
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should be uncovered or outed (that is, a well-formed community of inquiry should be 
resistant to conspiracy if it emerges in a society which is largely open15). 
But the real issue here—which separates Stokes’s work from mine and that of Basham—is 
the worry about the kind of accusations implicit in some conspiracy theories, and the way in 
which they (sometimes) can entail particular harms. 
 
Accusations Without Merit 
 
Using the example of recurrent anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (or narratives, as I termed 
them) as his example, Stoke writes: 
 
[W]e not morally or rationally obliged to entertain every theory, we are 
morally obliged to reject some theories even at the risk of occasionally being 
wrong.16 
 
I appreciate Stoke’s point here; conspiracy theories or narratives which suggest that, say, the 
Jewish people are behind the world’s various calamities are, indeed, of the kind we have 
grounds to not treat seriously. Or, at least, most of us do. The reason why most of us have 
grounds to not treat these claims seriously is both the harm such theories cause, and the fact 
that—on investigation—these theories routinely turn out to be baseless.17 The relationship 
between these two claims—harms and baselessness—are tightly intertwined. Our 
communities of inquiry, we should hope, will know this. They will not theorise in a vacuum. 
If they investigate some alleged Jewish banking cartel plot, they do it with the knowledge of 
systemic racism, a familiarity with tropes, and an eye on new, and compelling evidence. 
 
However, it is important to note that we already allow some pretty extreme accusations to be 
made in the public sphere. Many government chambers allow politicians to make 
accusations on the public record without being subject to libel or defamation. The police can arrest 
and charge people on what is—to many an epistemologist or ethicist—troublingly vague 
evidence, and various security services make claims about people on the basis of secret 
evidence (which may or may not exist). Now, we might object to all of these examples, but 
we have systems in place which allow accusations to be made, and for them to be 
challenged.18 
 
It is also worthwhile to note that a community of inquiry which investigates some particular 
conspiracy theory need not do it publicly; the members might work behind closed doors, 
only going public once an investigation has been concluded. Secret investigations into 
conspiracy theories, I realise, seem almost prima facie problematic, but unless we think of 
these investigations as being necessarily public in nature, there is no reason why concerned 
                                                
15 All bets are off if the society is towards the closed end of the spectrum, of course. 
16 Stokes 2017, 50–51. 
17  Not just that; we have good anthropological and sociological theories as to how these narratives first 
emerged, which strongly suggest that the appellation ‘conspiracy’ in these cases was insincerely fomented by 
agents who wanted to blame the Jewish people, in order to make them scapegoats. 
18 Admittedly, the fact we allow these accusations to be made does not tell us anything about the morality of 
making them. However, the fact there are societal agreements about when such accusations can (and cannot) 
be made speaks to the idea that we at least tolerate allowing discussion of certain extreme claims in a range of 
cases. 
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citizens cannot start their investigation behind closed doors. Indeed, think of the case of a 
community of inquiry into the Moscow Trials of the 1930s; if you were a Muscovite, would 
you want your work to be public?19 
 
Stokes also makes the following claim about the moral cost of my dispassionate 
investigator(s) speculations: 
 
Dentith’s dispassionate speculator may not be doing very much practical 
harm, but she is nonetheless engaging in a practice with a moral cost. My 
walking into a room and idly wondering if you’re planning to kill me may not 
cause you much upset—mostly because I wouldn’t mention doing so, as that 
would make things pretty awkward—but I’ve still entertained the idea you 
might be a murderer, and thereby done you a passing wrong.20 
 
I am sympathetic to this point. A similar argument stands for why we rightfully cast 
opprobrium on racist speech. After all, someone might claim that is logically possible members 
of a particular ethnicity (or the opposite sex, etc.) have lower IQs than members of some 
other group. However, most of us realise that treating such a claim seriously is likely to cause 
more harm than good; the very act of engaging in the anthropological (or sociological, etc.) 
research involved creates the idea such notions are respectable, and thus deserving of serious 
scrutiny. All such an investigation will do—even in the case of a null result—is give 
proponents of such a theory grounds to say ‘Look, those boffins at Yale thought it was 
worth checking out…’ Whilst in theory any idea is worth investigating, or treating seriously, in 
practice there are certain ideas which deserve scrutiny only if we have good grounds to investigate 
them. Indeed, sometimes we have good socially-constituted reasons to think certain questions 
need not be raised, or, if raised, not answered.21 
 
Yet consider the following hypothetical: a woman walks into a room and finds herself alone 
with a man. Does she cause a passing wrong by entertaining the notion she might not be 
safe in that situation? I don’t think so, but even if she does, it seems both justifiable and 
outweighed by the need for caution. Or think of the detective who, on investigating the 
murder of a spouse immediately suspects the surviving partner as a matter of course. Is this 
also a passing wrong, given that she knows a crime has been committed, and that the most 
likely culprit in such cases is the surviving spouse? 
 
Investigators think like this all the time, and I do not think this is a problem per se. Yes, such 
thinking entails beliefs which—if expressed in a certain way, or in particular contexts—can 
                                                
19 There is also a question about whether we are concerned with open practices, or merely open and accessible 
results? That is, could we—in some cases—run our investigation in secret? Then, once we have our findings, 
publish all the data (and give a full accounting of our investigative method), and thus by ‘revealing’ our secret 
to the world, circumvent the issues associated with such a secretive investigation? 
20 Stokes 2017, 50. 
21 Some will claim that such grounds should not be of interest to the epistemologist, but I would counter by 
saying that the social epistemologist is very much aware of the social-constituted nature of knowledge, and how 
these things play out. 
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cause harm. Apropos of nothing, if I walk into a room and tell you that I think you are 
planning to kill, that likely will damage our friendship. My idly thinking it, however, does not 
strike me as problematic. However, I guess it all depends on what ‘idly’ means here; if it is a 
passing thought, then I cannot see how it causes harm at all. If it persists throughout the 
conversation I am having with you, causing me to act nervously or become reticent around 
you, maybe that does mean I’ve wronged you in some sense. 
 
Now, admittedly, this kind of response entails a problem: if we accept that investigators (or, 
our putative community of inquiry) think like this all the time, and some investigations can 
be undertaken in secret, then surely there is nothing wrong about some community going 
off, behind closed doors, and looking into the question about IQs being lower in that 
particular ethnicity? Surely Stoke’s argument that such putative accusations/speculations are 
problematic points to the central intuition as to why some of us might think they entail 
passing wrongs? 
 
Stokes notes that ‘default background trust that is a condition for social life.’22 I do not 
disagree; for the most part, ordinary epistemic agents should operate with a degree of trust in 
others. Otherwise it is hard to establish even the basics of human life, let alone much 
knowledge, given how social constituted most of our knowledge is. Yet the whole point of 
this talk of conspiracy theories is to push the idea that some one, or some body needs to 
take these claims seriously, and investigate them in order to preserve that ‘default 
background trust.’ Such trust is—at least, I would argue, in the case of politics—not a prima 
facie given; it is earned, and the reason why people trust their governments comes out of 
some belief that the threats to said trust are investigated, or going to be investigated. It may 
mean that investigators must do work that other (more ordinary) epistemic agents are not 
obliged to do. Some of that work might even be dirty. But—and I hope this speaks to 
Stokes’ concern here—our investigators, or community of inquiry, will not only be cognisant 
of conspiracy narratives, but that some of their putative work might entail passing wrongs. 
Thus they will only be motivated to investigate when there are new, compelling reasons to 
do so. 
 
Primed for Failure? 
 
Let me end by pre-empting the most obvious criticism to the community of inquiry 
approach I am advocating. Surely this is how we already investigate conspiracy theories? Isn’t 
this project a dismal failure from the start? Whilst we can point to interested communities of 
inquiry which uncovered the conspiracies behind the Moscow Show Trials (lead by John 
Dewey, whose terminology I am borrowing), Watergate, and the like, the sceptic of this 
approach will gesture towards on-going calls to re-investigate 9/11, the assassination of JFK, 
and the claims the MMR vaccine is responsible for the uptick in autism diagnoses. In these 
cases, nothing seems to have been settled, and we have rival communities of inquiry claiming 
the other side are stupid, irrational, or engaged in a cover-up. 
 
What is happening here? Is the problem one of these communities of inquiry being badly 
constituted (which then raises question: how might we better form them?), or is there some 
                                                
22 Stokes 2017, 57. 
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other, lingering issue getting in the way of their investigations. I would hazard that it is a little 
of both. Given the pejorative labelling of these things called ‘conspiracy theories’, 
investigations into them tend to fall into two camps: those who think the conspiracy has 
occurred, and those who want to show that the conspiracy theorists are a bunch of wackos. 
That is, arguably, most of our communities of inquiry (at least when it comes to 
investigations into conspiracy theories) start from an assumption that the members already 
know the conclusion, and thus are looking for evidence to prove it to the unbeliever. 
 
Part—and I’d like to stress that this is only part—of this problem is the spectre of 
Generalism: the pathologising approach to the treatment of belief in conspiracy theories 
Basham, Stokes, and myself have been discussing in these pages. The ‘she said/he said’ 
approach to dealing with conspiracy theories in public discourse often bifurcates along the 
lines of ‘these theories are prima facie irrational!’ and ‘you’re ignoring the elephant in the 
room!’. The only salve to this worry would be to ensure that any community of inquiry 
include members who have diverse attitudes to these things called ‘conspiracy theories.’ This 
is not just a salve to the conspiracy theorist; after all, the sceptic of conspiracy theories will 
also be concerned about communities of inquiry made up of people who already assume the 
existence of the very conspiracies they are investigating. 
 
We might think of this as being a ‘Devil’s Advocate’ condition: for the investigation of any 
conspiracy theory to pass muster, there must be some members of the community who will 
challenge the need or urgency to investigate some given claim, and some members who will 
argue that pursuing, or treating seriously this conspiracy theory is a potentially dangerous 
activity. Given that a community’s findings will be more akin to a judicial decision than a 
jury decision (dissenters should always be able to explain their minority view), even if the 
sceptic is not convinced by the community’s findings, their presence in the investigation will 
surely be of value. 
 
This is no different as to how we debate the issues in Philosophy, or Physics, or Sociology, 
and so it should be the same when it comes to these things called ‘conspiracy theories.’ That 
is, if our investigative communities of inquiry are properly constituted. But that is a 
discussion for another time. 
 
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Ori Freiman, and Patrick Stokes for feedback on an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
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